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*Graduate Student, Department of Economics, University
of Michigan.
Recently, an article appeared which is a superb example
of what we might call advocacy econometrics.2 The article, by
Dale Jorgenson and CalTin’siebert [4Vhas already crept into
some graduate course reading lists, at least at the University
of Michigan, and thus, by some, is considered important. It
seems, however, that there are serious methodological problems
in the article. Most important, the authors seem to be in
error when they claim their work contributes to the empirical
testing of the neo-classical theory of the firm. It is intend-
ed to demonstrate these points below as well as to suggest
some reasons for the present healthly state of the neo-clas-
sical theory of the firm.
Advocacy Econometrics
At Columbia University’s Spring 1966 Commencement exer-
cises, former President Grayson Kirk is reported to have ex-
tolled the beauties and benefits of &dquo;value-free&dquo; science.
Nevertheless, it is open to question whether any social science
can be &dquo;objective&dquo;. With respect to economics, Mike Zweig, in
a very provocative paper [9], pointed out a number of value-
ladden aspects of price theory. A similar critique may be at-
tempted for econometrics. Here, however, we shall merely as-
sert that our values contribute to our biases and help deter-
mine what theories we think up or believe to be true. In ef-
fect, we begin where Zweig ended. That is, we shall concen-
trate on the nonobjectivity.
In science, theories are never proved true or false,
but are rejected or not rejected. Thus, economics as a science
relies very heavily on those empirical specialists who attempt
to convince us to reject or not. Let it first be noted the
econometrician’s task is fundamentally difficult, requiring
everything from the ability to organize anarchic information
into useful categories, thus forming data, to the ability to
use this data to evaluate theories in some meaningful way.
If economics is &dquo;science&dquo;, econometrics is &dquo;art&dquo;--there is
judgement at every step.3
One major problem in the evaluation of theories is how
to operationalize them for testing. We are all aware, I am
sure, of the psychologist’s dilemma,confounding intelligence
with I.Q. scores,as well as our own problem of discovering
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the empirical equivalent of the elusive Platonic ideal, &dquo;cap-
ital&dquo;. If one wants to compare theories, one should not want
the outcome determined before even getting to the data. For
example, one wants to make sure he is indeed comparing dif-
ferent theories, rather than different operational forms of
the same theory. In this way we are led to study the &dquo;art&dquo; of
making a theory operational. ,
Jorgenson and Siebert set out to compare various theo-
ries of investment behavior in a microeconomic setting. They
concluded that the neo-classical theory of the firm is the
best available description of investment behavior for the
specific firms studied, such as General Motors, Goodyear, 
.
General Electric, Standard Oil of New Jersey, IBM, and so on.
In addition, although clothed in academic humility, there was
a note of implicit jubilation in their closing paragraphs on
emerging victorious over the insurgents and on restoring peace
to Camelot.
We conclude that the objections to the neo-
classical theory of the firm as a basis for
the theory of investment behavior...are ill-
founded. The appeal to a broader view of en-
trepreneurial objectives is not supported by
evidence from econometric studies of cost and
production functions or from studies of invest-
ment behavior. ( [4] , p. 709)
It appears that the authors view their study, at least
in part, as a comparison of the neo-classical idealization of
the firm against a &dquo;broader&dquo; view in which the firm is charac-
terized as a complex organization in a complex environment.
But do they actually do this? We turn to their work to show
they do not.
Jorgenson and Siebert accept as common to the &dquo;theo-
ries&dquo; to be tested that they can be formulated as flexible
accelerator models in which a firm’s net investment is pro-
portional to the difference between its actual capital stock
and its desired capital stock (defined in some way). This
formulation is equivalent to a distributed lag model in which
actual capital stock is a function of past and present de-
sired capital stock. The &dquo;theories&dquo; are to differ, then, in
what they suppose are the determinants of desired capital
stock. Let us then turn to these &dquo;theories&dquo;. 
’
The &dquo;theory&dquo; that did worst in their tests presumes
that desired capital stock is determined by &dquo;the flow of in-
ternal funds available for investment&dquo; ([4], p. 685); ¡ i.e.,
realized profits (specifically, retained earnings plus depre-
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ciation) are assumed to be a proxy for expected profits from
investment. Now, profits should be relevant to investment
decisions, but not necessarily to desired capital stock. Pro-
fit may operate as a constraint on investment spending if the
firm relies primarily on internal funding; but to suggest 
’
that firms take profits as a proxy for expected profits is to
oversimplify to the point of assuming that businesses are
stupid. On the other hand, if econmetricians assume firms act
as if current profits are what are used to forecast expected
pro its in an analysis of real firms studied as individual
units, then it would seem econometricians act &dquo;as if&dquo; econo-
metricians are stupid. However, the only way liquidity con-
siderations, as a separate hypothesis, can be forced into
Jorgenson and Siebert’s flexible accelerator framework is to
have these determine desired capital stock. In fact, the
authors switch back and forth claiming the liquidity consi-
derations imply, on the one hand, an expected profits hypo-
thesis ([4], p. 685) and, on the other, a cost of capital
hypothesis ([4], same page, same paragraph).
Thus, it seems the &dquo;liquidity theory&dquo; does not repre-
sent the &dquo;broader&dquo; view. The liquidity theory might have
been put forward as a programmed decision rule used by firms
such that the hypothesis would fall out of the behavioral
theory of the firm, except no advocate of the theory, I think,
would put business fixed investment into the programmable,de-
cision category. If anything, this &dquo;liquidity theory&dquo; can be
construed as a very simple, &dquo;testable,&dquo; operational form of
. 
neo-classical profit maximazation.
A second &dquo;theory&dquo; which did measurably better on the
authors’ tests takes the market value of the firm as the
proxy for expected profitability from investment.4 This argu-
ment has some grounding in price theory where market value
is said to be determined by the present value of expected
future profit flows. But, again, this formulation is an opera-
tionalization of neo-classical theory and not some &dquo;broader&dquo;
view.
The third &dquo;theory&dquo;, which did about as well as the
second, is the flexible accelerator proper; desired capital
stock is to be proportional to current output. In this &dquo;theo--
ry&dquo;, firms are said to want to maintain either some desired
constant capital/output ratio or capacity utilization rate,
or are said to use output or sales as a proxy for profitabi-
lity of new investment. In the latter case this &dquo;theory&dquo; is
again not a &dquo;broader&dquo; view, and in the former this &dquo;theory&dquo;
is usually presented as a rough and ready, ad hoc, aggregate
relation between investment and output with its derivation
from any price theory usually implicit.5 In either case, where
is the &dquo;broader&dquo; view?
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Finally, Jorgenson and Siebert present their version of
the neoclassical theory based on a maximization of net worth
(discounted net revenue) objective function from which is de-
rived the first order condition’that the marginal product of
capital should equal the rental rate on capital (or &dquo;user
cost&dquo;) divided by the price of output. All that the authors
wanted from the first order condition is an elaborate expres-
sion for user cost of capital which involves an investment
goods price index, the rate of replacement, a cost-of-capital
term, the corporate income tax rate and &dquo;the proportion of de-
preciation at replacement cost deductible from income for tax
purposes&dquo; ([4], p. 695).6 This user cost, ct, is related to
desired capital stock, Kf through the elasticity of output,
~ , which is constant for’Cobb-Douglas production functions,
but not in general. Thus, 
’
where ptQt is the value of output. This complicated and subtle
formulation is to do battle with, for example, functions of
the form
for the accelerator model. It would seem the effects on desir-
ed capital picked up by the accelerator model through Qt might
also be picked up by the neo-classical formulation since Qt
appears there as well.
The main thrust of my argument is that Jorgenson and
Siebert are not comparing different theories but rather al-
ternate formulations of the same theory. Their results, that
the most complete formulation does best intheir tests, should
not be surprising if there is any predictive value at all in
the neo-classical theory. Further, if the formulations above
are supposed to represent operationalizations of &dquo;broader&dquo;
theories, they also conform to operationalizations of neo-
classical theory. How then are we to interpret tests reject-
ing these formulations?
In addition, not only are they not testing different
theories, but because the only firms they studied were fif-
teen of the largest American giants, they blow their whole
bit by writing, &dquo;Of course, considerable care should be taken
in extrapolating the results of the present study to small
firms...&dquo; ( [4] , p. 692) .~ Thus, G.M. is &dquo;shown&dquo;to operate as
a neo-classical firm but perhaps the dealers on the Chicago
grain exchange do not.
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It may well be the case that the authors were not ini-
tially concerned with the theories behind the models they used,
but were merely concerned with the theories behind the models
which had previously been used with varying and contradictory
success by a host of authors. This seems implicit throughout
their paper until their conclusion where they relate their
work to the challenges posed to the theory of the firm made
within the professional establishment. In other words, the
relevance of their work to the theory of the firm may have
been only an afterthought, but an important one. -
The importance of this may be seen in a statement by
Herbert Simon with which Jorgenson and Siebert disagree. They
quote Simon, .
I should like to emphasize strongly that neither
the classical theory of the firm, nor any of the
amendments to it or substitutes for it that have
been proposed [written in 1962] have had any sub-
stantial amount of empirical testing. ([4], p.




Simon ignores the entire econometric literature on
’ 
cost and production funtions, all of which is bas-
ed on the neoclassical theory of the firm. The evi-
dence is so largely favorable to the theory that
current empirical research emphasizes such techni-
cal questions as the appropriate form for the pro-
duction function and the statistical specification
for econometric models of production based on this
theory. Simon’s characterization of alternatives
to the neoclassical theory of the firm is correct;
this theory [sic] has not been subjected to sub-
stantial empirical testing. However, his characte-
rization of the empirical evidence on the neoclds-
sical theory is seriously incomplete.([4], p. 709.)
I have the impression they missed the point. To build
statistical models more or less derived from the received
theory of the firm and to fit these to data and to go no fur-
ther is not to test a theory. We should require, at least, a
comparison of the predictive value of the statistically fitted
model with some naive model on different data from that used
to derive the statistical model. But Jorgenson and Siebert
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run their tests on the same data used to fit their equations.
By the most common tenet of scientific methodology we
never &dquo;accept&dquo; hypotheses. We either reject or refrain from
rejecting them. Our confidence in our theories grows as the
number of times we try to reject and fail mounts. However, to
fit a curve is not an attempt to reject a theory. In other
words, experimenting with various operational forms until a
satisfactory formulation is found is not testing a theor.y. How
many times do econometricians go to their work hoping to dis-
confirm a hypothesis derived from neo-classical arguments?
To repeat Simon, has there been &dquo;any substantial amount of
empirical testing&dquo;?
Competing in Economics . 
’
It seems we do not usually see tests of theories in
economics unless someone is interested in’ debunking one theory
to support another. Milton Friedman put forth his permanent
income hypothesis and econometricians began trying to disprove
it. Thus, for example, we have Ronald Bodkin’s test [1] and
Friedman’s discussion claiming that the results which seemed .
to strongly reject the permanent income hypothesis really
conformed with it, &dquo;properly&dquo; interpreted; i.e., that Bodkin
had not made the correct transformation from theory to ope-
rational model. In other words we have the advocates of op-
posing theories fighting it out: one sets up a test which may
be damaging, in which case the other tries to show the test
illicit.
We can further illustrate this point with a paper by
Eisner and Nadiri [2] which claims to refute Jorgenson’s
neo-classical investment model by showing the alpha in his
equation (see above) is not constant empirically. That is,
they claim to show, on the same data Jorgenson used previously,
that the elasticity of substitution is closer to zero than to
one (the Cobb-Douglas case for which alpha is constant) and
that the elasticity of output with respect to capital (alpha)
is indeed rather high which indicates the good results obtain-
ed by Jorgenson in earlier tests were due more to the accele-
rator term than acknowledged. Jorgenson and Siebert, in
the paper discussed in the previous section, test the accele- ’
rator model against the &dquo;neo-classical&dquo; model on individual
firm data and find, as mentioned, their model does better. I
expect the other side will soon rebut and we shall be off on
another round. 
Because econometrics is so much an art, it seems advo- 
8
cacy econometrics is the only way any &dquo;progress&dquo; can be made
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We can expect Friedman and Meiselman to run a test of Keyne-
sian versus Quantity theories which vindicates the Quantity
theory and we should not be surprised when an issue of the
AER (September, 1965) is, for the most part, devoted to re-
buttals questioning their technique and models. Econometrics
is certainly not &dquo;objective&dquo;. However, it should be clearly
understood that I am not implying that there are attempts to
defraud. Rather, our methods are influenced by our biases,
perhaps with acumen sharpened in the heat of battle, perhaps
not.
Barriers to Entry
We may now return to Herbert Simon’s complaint: why are
there few tests of alternate theories of the firm? In some
respect these theories may not be any threat to neo-classical
theory. Of the existing new theories, few attack neo-classical
theory but rather treat problems about which neo-classical
theory is ambiguous, e.g. oligopoly behavior. Thus, Fritz
Machlup [5] calls for a love-in for the different theories,
different theories for different problems. Also, even in that
area of overlapping concern in which theories could be com-
pared there is still the difficulty of operationalizing the
new theories. Another problem, at least with the behavioral
theory of the firm, is that hypotheses comparable to those of
the neo-classical theory are not developed. The theories are
in two different worlds. If a &dquo;political economy&dquo; theory of
the firm should arise from our collective endeavors, it may
well operate in a &dquo;third world&dquo; because the considerations
with which we may deal will not be those allowed for in neo-
classical theory.
This suggests, I think on a superficial level, why
there is no econometric battle over the neo-classical theory:
there is little direct conflict between theories and thus no
advocates to do each other in. Jorgenson and Siebert’s advo-
cacy econometrics is really part of a family squabble within
the neo-classical camp; factionalism if you will.
Be that as it may, we can now suggest why there is no
conflict of theories. Interupt a working economist and ask,
&dquo;what is a firm?&dquo; and repeat the question two days later when
he is working on a different problem and see if you get.the
same answer. The concept is elusive. When concerned with me-
thodology, which is often the case in rebutting critics of
&dquo;marginalism&dquo;, economists treat the neo-classical &dquo;firm&dquo; as a
total fiction, &dquo;a mental construct helping to explain how one
gets from the cause to the effect 
&dquo; in discussing market be-
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havior (Machlup [5], p. 9). In the Jorgenson and Siebert paper
the neo-classical firm is the real flesh and bones corporation:
G.M., I.B.M., etc. Should their results have proved less at-
tractive to their view, someone would have written sagaciously
that the firm is an abstraction and the theory certainly not
meant to describe the behavior of individual units like G.M.
This is not duplicity because we have not der ved rules todetermine when a firm is a firm and when not. This is confu-
sion.
Note, however, one additional point. If Machlup-Fried-
man &dquo;Platonists&dquo; predominate, economics comes to be defined
as the study of markets (not even of behavior in markets)
rather than the study of getting and spending, or as Samuel-
son’s text puts it, determining &dquo;what, how and for whom&dquo;. The
area of economic analysis is then severely circumscribed; cer-
tain questions can not be handled (income distrihution, imper-
t n j j Hili, U B(’ military-industrial complex and other aspects of
corporate structure such as conglomerates, etc.). In particu-
1fB1’, there i 9 then neo room for political economy in economics.
%qt.s ntc defined an blB.lI..’1Bl..dnq i~~ &dquo;nolhcr (presumedly empty?) box.
Yes, ladies and gentlemen, I fear we are to be banished, sus-
pended, expelled, expunged or ignored (depending on what year
one sits in (or sat in) at the University of Chicago.
In sum, I have tried to indicate the advocacy nature
of econometrics and to suggest why neo-classical theory is as
healthy as it is. It needs a healthy challenge.
. Footnotes
1. The marginal product of this paper has been increased 
measurably by discussions with Professors W.H. Locke
Anderson and Sidney Winter. Professor Winter has especial-
ly made his imprint on the final sections of the paper.
2. Apologies to Rick Wolff for bastardizing the title of his
paper in the 1968 URPE Conference Papers [8].
3. This applies also to the statistical tests used by most
econometricians which, as any Bayesian will argue for
hours, are essentially arbitrary.
4. Actually, here the authors also treat this theory as if
firms desired to maintain a constant ration between capi-
tal stock and market value of the firm [4], p. 695), but
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this seems absurd and not derived from any arguments.
5. Development economists have had an especially good time
showing how constant aggregate capital/output ratios can
only be derived from micro-theory under the most extreme
and absurd assumptions. See, for example, the demolition
in Appendix 3 of Gunnar Myrdal’s Asian Drama[6].
6. See also [3], pp. 248-9, for a derivation of this expres-
sion. 
7. Since this statement appears early in the article in their
data section they perhaps forgot it when warming to their
grand conclusion.
8. It should also be noted that the advocacy metaphor is in-
complete because there is no rule making and conflict re-
solving bar before which we advocate -- only advocates and
jury.
9. This point is Professor Sidney Winter’s.
References
1. R. Bodkin, "Windfall Income and Consumption", and comment
by Milton Friedman, in I. Friend and R. Jones, eds., Pro-
ceedings of the Conference on Consumption and Saving Vol.
II (Philadelphia, 1960), 175-187, 191-206.
2. R. Eisner and M.I. Nadiri, "Investment Behavior and Neo-
Classical Theory", Review of Economics and Statistics, L,
No. 3, (August, 1968). 369-382.
3. D. Jorgenson, "Capital Theory and Investment Behavior",
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, LIII,
No. 2, (May, 1963), 247-259.
4. D. Jorgenson and C. Siebert, "A Comparison of Alternate
Theories of Corporate Investment Behavior", American Eco-
nomic Review, LVIII, No. 4, (September, 1968), 681-712.
5. F. Machlup, "Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral,
Managerial", American Economic Review, LVII, No. 1,
(March, 1967), 1-33.
6. G. Myrdal, Asian Drama, 3 vols., (New York, 1968).
7. H. Simon, "New Developments in the Theory of the Firm",
84
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, LII, No.
2, (May, 1962), 1-15. 
8. R. Wolff, "Advocacy Economics", Conference Papers of the
Union for Radical Political Economics, (Ann Arbor, 1968), 
178-181.
9. M. Zweig, "New Left Critique of Economics", Conference
Papers of the Union for Radical Political Economics,
(Ann Arbor, 1968), 46-52.
